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Heterogeneous Firms, Trade, and Economic Policy: 
Insights from a Simple Two-Sector Model
* 
 
The robust empirical finding that exporting firms are systematically different from firms that 
merely serve domestic consumers has inspired the development of a new brand of trade 
theory, the theory of heterogeneous firms and trade. The establishment of a canonical model 
due to Melitz (2003) has induced a recent wave of research which explores various policy 
issues and policy instruments. This paper uses a simple tractable two-sector model of 
monopolistic competition as unifying framework to bring out key lessons of this recent 
research. We address the gains from trade, country asymmetries involving technology 
potentials, market sizes, trade openness and various business conditions as well as the 
international repercussions that emerge when countries non-cooperatively choose entry 
subsidies and their levels of basic research. We also reinvestigate the process of market exit. 
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1  Introduction 
The  robust  empirical  finding  that  exporting  firms  are  not  only  rare  but  also  systematically 
different  from  firms  that  merely  serve  domestic  consumers  has  challenged  both  the  old 
Ricardian and neoclassical trade theories as well as the new trade theories along the lines of 
Krugman,  Brander  and  Spencer.  To  account  for  the  empirical  fact  that  exporting  firms  are 
typically larger and more productive than non-exporters, a new generation of new trade models 
was developed which takes the heterogeneity of firms in terms of their productivity into account 
with seminar contributions by Melitz (2003), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) and 
Yeaple (2005).
1 Follow-up research led to a voluminous literature that expanded the scope of 
these theories of heterogeneous firms and trade to comprehend endowment-driven comparative 
advantage (Bernard, Redding and Schott 2007), competition effects (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008) 
and the repercussions between trade, FDI and labor markets, amongst others.
2 
A very recent strand of research has started to explore the economic policy implications of the 
theories of heterogeneous firms and trade. Melitz (2003) has initiated this policy analysis by 
showing that countries reap welfare gains by shifting from autarky to trade (i.e. there are gains 
from  trade)  and  by  proving  that  reciprocal  trade  liberalization  is  welfare  enhancing  for  all 
parties. However, his analysis was confined to a setting where countries are identical in all 
respects.  Yet,  countries  do  differ  along  many  dimensions,  such  as  size,  technologies  and  a 
variety of other business conditions, in practice. Can we be sure that his insights still hold when 
country asymmetries are taken into account? It is comforting to see that recent research has 
shown the gains from trade to be robust when countries are (strongly) asymmetric in many 
dimensions that have so far been put under scrutiny. However, recent work also conveys the 
message that matters may be different when countries already engage in trade. Technological 
improvements in one country’s modern sector then unambiguously hurt the trading partner. 
When business conditions in a broad sense are superior in one country, trade liberalization 
brings a welfare benefit to the superior country whereas the inferior country may experience a 
welfare loss. Moreover, it has also been shown that the liberalization path matters, i.e. it makes 
a big difference whether liberalization is unilateral or reciprocal. 
Further important policy questions have been addressed in recent work. One strand of research 
recognizes that governments are heavily engaged in the regulation of entry by requiring licences, 
                                                 
1 Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) and Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) summarize the empirical work. 
2 Examples of the labor market applications are Eckel and Egger (2009), Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), 
Felbermayr et al. (2010), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010). Chor (2009) 
analyses FDI subsidies. Helpman (2006) and Redding (2010) provide surveys of the development of the theories of 
heterogeneous firms and trade. 2 
permits and other legal barriers. On the other hand, they also provide various types of support 
for the foundation of new firms, e.g. subsidies to market entry and R&D activities. Interestingly, 
in contrast to classical trade policy instruments (such as import tariffs or export subsidies) these 
policies are perceived as largely domestic issues and therefore not put under scrutiny by bodies 
like  the  WTO.  It  is  nonetheless  important  to  ask  whether  these  policies  have  international 
repercussions and how they play out. Recent research shows that such policies indeed involve 
international  spillovers  and  that  governments  therefore  may  have  an  incentive  to  use  these 
instruments strategically in the open economy.  
The process of market exit is yet another issue which has received attention recently. Melitz 
(2003)  focused  on  a  stationary  equilibrium  where  firms  die  with  a  constant  probability 
irrespectively  of  their  productivity  and  are  replaced  by  new  entrants.  However,  there  is 
overwhelming  empirical  evidence  that  highly  productive  firms  are  much  less  prone  to  firm 
death  than  unproductive  ones.  Incorporating  this  fact  into  a  theoretical  framework  delivers 
insights for the average death rates of mature firms and their determinants. For example, the 
switch from autarky to trade implies not only an increase in the average productivity of firms 
but also a reduction in the risk of business exit. 
The aim of this paper is to work out and synthesize the key lessons of this recent research in a 
unifying framework. To bring these results out with utmost simplicity, we use a two-sector 
version of the Melitz (2003) model with a competitive sector (‘traditional good’) in addition to 
the  monopolistically  competitive  sector  with  heterogeneous  firms  (‘modern  sector’).  The 
fruitfulness of this modelling strategy was already convincingly demonstrated by Helpman and 
Krugman  (1985;  1989)  in  exposing  the  policy  implications  of  the  new  trade  theory  with 
homogeneous firms.
3 The seminal papers by Melitz and Ottaviano (2009) and Demidova (2008) 
were the first contributions which adopted two-sector frameworks to analyze the implications of 
the  theories  of  heterogeneous  firms  and  trade.  Our  synthesis  follows  Demidova  (2008)  in 
choosing a CES-Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) representation of the modern sector. We deviate from her 
by assuming a simple yet standard specification of the research and development process and by 
working with a simpler, quasi-linear, upper tier utility function. These two changes allow us to 
gain considerable tractability. In particular, we are able to provide all results in closed-form. 
Melitz  and  Ottaviano  (2008)  provide  an  alternative  two-sector  model  of  monopolistic 
competition  with  heterogeneous  firms  which,  by  the  assumption  of  a  quadratic  quasi-linear 
upper tier utility function, is already much more tractable than the one-sector Melitz (2003) 
                                                 
3 See also Flam and Helpman (1987), Venables (1987), Martin and Rogers (1995) and Baldwin et al. (2003). 3 
model.
4 Rather  than  using  the  Dixit-Stiglitz  specification  of  the  modern  sector,  Melitz  and 
Ottaviano  (2008)  employ  the  linear  demand  system  with  horizontal  product  differentiation 
along  the  lines  of  Ottaviano,  Tabuchi  and  Thisse  (2002).  In  contrast  to  the  Dixit-Stiglitz 
framework  which  implies  that  mark-ups  over  marginal  costs  are  constant  across  firms  and 
invariant to market size in the large-group case the linear Ottaviano-Tabuchi-Thisse-framework 
features a pro-competitive effect. This feature renders the latter framework without any doubt 
attractive. However, as many of the recent papers have used the Dixit-Stiglitz-specification as in 
Melitz (2003), we use the same as it facilitates the exposition and discussion of these works. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section covers the model under autarky. 
Section 3 discusses a two country trade version of the model. Section 4 contains our policy 
analysis.  We  cover  gains  from  trade,  trade  liberalization  with  identical  countries,  the 
implications of differences in technology potentials, the competitive choice of entry subsidies 
and  of  policies  targeted  the  infrastructure  of  basic  research,  the  implications  of  business 
conditions along many dimensions, and the process of market exit. Section 5 concludes. 
2  The Model 
General  set-up.  We  build  on  the  two-sector  version  of  the  Melitz  (2003)  model  with 
heterogeneous  firms  developed  by  Demidova  (2008).  A  traditional  industry  n  produces  a 
homogeneous numéraire good under constant returns to scale and perfect competition, and a 
modern monopolistic competitive industry c produces a continuum of differentiated varieties 
under increasing returns. Each variety is produced by a single firm. Firms’ productivities are 
heterogeneous. Labor is the only factor of production in the economy. There are  L workers 
who supply one unit of labor each. We first look at a single country in autarky. 
Preferences. Household h’s preferences over the homogenous good 
h n  and the set of modern 
varieties, W, are defined by a logarithmic quasi-linear utility function with CES sub-utility 
h c
5 
     












h h dz z q c      (1) 
where  1 0 < < r  and  0 > b  are  constant  parameters  and  ( ) z q
h  expresses  h 's  consumption  of 
variety  z . The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is given by  1 ) 1 /( 1 > - º r s .  
                                                 
4 An extension and calibration of the Melitz-Ottaviano model is provided in Del Gatto et al. (2006). 
5 We deviate from Demidova (2008) who assumes Cobb-Douglas preferences. Quasi-linear preferences remove the 
income effect from the modern sector. They are widely used in theories of geography and trade because of their 
tractabilty (e.g. Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse 2002, Antras and Helpman 2004 and Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). 4 
The budget constraint reads  w n c P
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is the perfect price index of the CES-aggregate. Utility maximization implies demand functions 
P c
h / b =  for  the  modern  good  and  b - = w n
h  for  the  traditional  good,  respectively. 
Household h’s indirect utility is  ) 1 (ln ln - + - = b b b P w v
h . Since households are identical 
we drop the index h from now on. We assume  w < b  to ensure non-negative demand for the 
homogeneous good. Aggregation over households implies that the overall expenditure on the 
modern industry, PcL , equals  L b . Aggregate demand for variety  z  is  L P z p z q b
s s 1 ) ( ) (
- - = , 
and total revenue for that variety is  [ ] L z p P z q z p z r b
s 1 ) ( / ) ( ) ( ) (
- = = . 
Technology and pricing. The numéraire-sector transforms a units of labor into one unit of 
output. The wage is then pinned down at  a w / 1 = . Technologies in the modern sector are such 
that  j / q f l + =  units of labor are needed to produce q units of output. The fixed overhead 
labor  f  is the same for all firms, the variable labor requirement ( ) j / 1  differs across firms. We 
consider the case where firms have zero mass. Each firm then perceives a demand curve with 
constant price elasticity  s - . Profit maximization implies that a firm with marginal cost ( j / w ) 
charges the price: 




p = ) (             (3) 
where  ( ) s s r 1 - º . Revenue and profits of this firm are then given by  ( ) ( )
1 /
- =
s rj b j w P L r  
and  f w r - = s j p / ) ( , respectively. A firm with higher productivity level j  thus charges a 
lower price, sells a larger quantity and has higher revenue and profits. Since all firm-specific 
variables differ only with respect to j , the CES price index (2) can be rewritten as  
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where M  denotes the mass of manufacturing firms (and varieties) in the market,  ( ) j m  is the 
productivity distribution across these active firms with positive support over a subset of ( ) ¥ , 0  
and j ~  is an average productivity level as introduced by Melitz (2003). 
Entry and exit. There exists a mass of potential entrepreneurs who can enter the modern sector, 
once they incur an up-front investment of  e f  units of labor. At each point in time a mass of 
E M  5 
entrepreneurs decides to enter. Upon entry these entrepreneurs learn about their productivity j , 
which is drawn from a common and known distribution function  ) (j G  with support ( ) ¥ , 0  and 
density  ) (j g . This is termed the 'productivity lottery'. After the productivity is revealed, an 
entrant decides whether to exit immediately or to remain active in the market, in which case the 
firm  earns  constant  per-period  profits  ( ) j p .  It  will  exit  immediately  if  ( ) 0 < j p ,  i.e. 
( ) f w r s j < .  Hence,  only  those  firms  remain  active  whose  productivity  draw  exceeds  the 
cutoff  0
* > j  at which profits are zero,  ( ) 0
* = j p . Once in the market, every firm may be hit 
with constant probability d  by a negative shock which forces it to shut down and exit. We 
focus on a stationary equilibrium without time discounting such that in each period the mass of 
market  entrants  equals  the  mass  of  firms  that  are  forced  to  shut  down.  Analytically, 
M M prob
E
i d = , where  ( )
* 1 j G probi - º  is the probability to draw a productivity no smaller 
than the cutoff 
* j . The endogenous productivity distribution among surviving firms,  ( ) j m , is 
thus the conditional (left-truncated) ex-ante distribution  ) (
* j g  on the domain [ ) ¥ ,
* j . 
Equilibrium and parameterization. The equilibrium in the modern sector is characterized by 
a free entry condition (FEC) and a zero cutoff profit condition (ZCPC) as in Melitz (2003). 
Assuming  risk  neutrality,  potential  entrepreneurs  enter  the  market  (i.e.  participate  in  the 
productivity lottery) until the value of entry  ( ) ( ) [ ] e t
t E f w E v - - = ∑
¥
=0 1 j p d  is driven to zero 
(FEC). Intuitively, this condition expresses that the expected stream of profits that can be reaped 
in the market in the infinite lifetime is at least as high as the upfront investment  e f w . The 
ZCPC  commands  that  the  cutoff  firm  makes  zero  profits,  ( ) 0
* = j p .  Intuitively,  since  the 
upfront  investment  is  sunk,  firms  engage  in  production  if  profits  are  non-negative.  The 
equilibrium cutoff productivity 
* j  simultaneously satisfies the FEC and the ZCPC (appendix 
A).  Melitz  (2003)  shows  that  such  an  equilibrium  cutoff  exists  for  a  general  class  of 
productivity distributions. However, a closed-form solution is not obtained unless an adequate 
specification is chosen for the productivity distribution. We follow much of the literature in 
assuming Pareto-distributed productivities,  ( )
k G j j j / 1 ) ( min - =  and  ( )
1
min ' ) (
- - = =
k k k G g j j j j  
where  0 min > j  is the lower bound for productivity draws and  1 > k  is the shape parameter.
6 
Apart from allowing a closed-form solution for the cutoff, this specification has the merit to be 
backed  by  the  empirics  (e.g.  Del  Gatto  et  al  2006,  Ikeda  and  Suoma  2009).  The  ex  post 
                                                 
6 See e.g. Bernard et al. (2003), Helpman et al. (2004), Baldwin (2005), Helpman et al. (2008) and Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008). 6 
probability  of  productivities  is  then  given  by  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 * * 1 /
+ - = - =
k k
k G g j j j j j m  if 
* j j >  
and  ( ) 0 = j m  otherwise. It follows that  ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) * 1 / 1 1 / ~ j s j
s- - - = k k , where we strengthen our 
previous assumption to  1 - >s k . Using these expressions in FEC and ZCPC yields the autarky 
equilibrium cutoff: 
























j           (5) 
Throughout the paper we assume the condition  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 1 1
/ 1 > × × + - × -
k
e f k f d s s  to ensure 
that  min
* j j > aut . The equilibrium cutoff is independent of the number of workers L, positively 
related to the elasticity of substitution s , the fixed labor  f  to serve the market and the lower 
bound  min j , and negatively related to the fixed investment of labor at the entry stage  e f , the 
death rate d , as well as the Pareto-shape parameter k .
7 Moreover, the autarky cutoff 
*
aut j  is 
unaffected by the labor coefficient in the competitive sector a since this coefficient affects the 
wage and hence the fixed costs both to enter and serve the market equi-proportionately. Once 
*
aut j  is determined, all other endogenous variables are easily derived (appendix B). The autarky 
price level is  ( )
( ) ( )( )
* 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / aut aut w f L P rj s b
s s s - - =  and a household’s indirect utility is then: 








































w v     (6) 
3  The Open Economy 
Country asymmetries. We now turn to an open economy with two countries  [ ] F H j i , , Î , say 
home H  and foreign F . These countries may differ with respect to country size  i L , the labor 
coefficient in the traditional sector  i a , technologies in the modern sector as expressed by the 
lower bounds  i min j  of the Pareto-distribution, exit rates  i d , the fixed upfront investment for 
entry in the modern sector  i e f ,  and the fixed labor input  i f  to serve domestic markets.  
Trade costs. If (after learning its productivity  i j ) a firm from country i decides to export to 
country  j  it faces an additional country-specific fixed cost  xi f , on top of the domestic per-
                                                 
7 In Melitz-Ottaviano (2008), the mark-ups on marginal costs are lower and the cutoff productivities therefore 
higher under autarky (and also under international trade), the greater is the domestic market size/labor force. 7 
period  fixed  costs  i f  that  accrue  irrespectively  of  export  status.  We  assume  that  i xi f f >  to 
ensure that only a part of the domestic firms is active in trade. We also assume  j xi f f >  so that 
the fixed labor input that has to be incurred to serve the export market exceeds the fixed labor 
that  foreign  competitors  have  to  incur  in  their  home  market.  Moreover,  there  are  variable 
iceberg costs to serve foreign consumers: for one unit to arrive in  j , a firm from country i has 
to ship  1 > ij t  units. We shall allow for the possibility that  ji ij t t ¹ , e.g. due to different trade 
policies  or  trade  infrastructures.  Trade  in  the  traditional  good  is  costless.  As  long  as  both 
countries produce this good, an assumption that we shall maintain throughout the paper, the law 
of one price dictates that the foreign wage is tied to the domestic wage,  F H H F a a w w W / / = º  
where W  denotes the relative foreign wage. Note that  i i a w / 1 =  by our choice of the numéraire. 
Hence, we do not impose factor prize equalization. 
Domestic and export cutoffs. The domestic cutoff productivities 
*
H j  and 
*
F j  are derived by 
making use of the conditions of free entry and zero cutoff profits which become interdependent 
in the open economy. If a firm from country i exports to country  j , its export profits are given 
by  xi i xi xi f w r × - = s j j p / ) ( ) (  where  j j i ij xi L P w r b rj t j
s s 1 1 ) / ( ) (
- - =  is the export revenue. There 
is a critical productivity threshold 
*
xi j  where such a firm breaks even on the export market, i.e. 
0 ) (
* = xi xi j p . We call this the export ZCPC. Furthermore, a firm from country i that serves her 
home market i derives profits  i i i i f w r - = s j j p / ) ( ) (  where  i i i i L P w r b j r j
s s 1 1 ) / ( ) (
- - =  is the 
associated revenue. The 
*
i j  where this firm breaks even is defined by  0 ) (
* = i i j p . We call this 
the domestic ZCPC. The revenue equations imply a link between export cutoffs and domestic 
cutoffs, 
* ) 1 /( *
F H xH t W j j
s s - - =  and 
* ) 1 /( *
H F xF t W j j
s s - =  where  ( )
) 1 /( 1 /
- º
s t j xi ij i f f t  (see appendix 
C). The free entry condition (FEC) for country i commands that firms enter the market until the 
value  of  entry  is  zero,  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ei i xi i xi xi i i i i f w prob prob = > + >
* * j j d j p E j j d j p E .  The  first 
term on the LHS formalizes the expected profits on the domestic market and the second term 
expresses  expected  profits  on  the  export  market  where  ) ( 1
*
xi i xi G prob j - º  denotes  the 
probability for a productivity draw high enough to enter the export market. The RHS expresses 
the entry costs.  
The resulting equilibrium cutoff productivities are derived as (see appendix D): 8 
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where  ( )
( ) ( ) 1 / 1 /
- + - - º




ij i f f  are measures of trade openness which rise as variable trade 
costs  ij t  and/or  the  fixed  cost  ratio  j xi f f /  fall.  Notice  that  j xi f f >  entails  1 0 < F £ i .  The 
parameter  ( ) 1 , , , min - º D
s s j d k k
e
w f W T DF
e  captures international differences (ratios) concerning exit 
rates  H F D d d / º , entry investments  eH eF e f f F / º , technologies in the manufacturing sector as 
proxied by the lower productivity bounds of the Pareto-distribution  F H T min min /j j º  and wage 
differentials  F H H F a a w w W / / = º  caused by productivity differences in the competitive sector. 
Note that 
w fe , , , min j d D  rises when home business conditions turn in favor of domestic firms. 
Parameter restrictions. We impose three parameter conditions on the open economy. First, we 
want  to  ensure  that  both  sectors  are  active  in  both  countries,  0 > i M  (non-specialization  in 
production),  both  before  and  after  trade.  This  is  the  case  whenever 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] l l l l
j d + × F F F + < D < F F + + × F 1 1 1




e  where  F H L L / º l  denotes  the 
labor endowment ratio across countries (see Appendix F). Second, in equilibrium the export 
cutoffs have to exceed the domestic cutoffs, 
* *
i xi j j > , so that, in line with the empirics, only 
domestically  active  firms  can  export.  This  is  guaranteed  by  the  assumption 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] xH H H xH H F H
w f
xF F F H F xF F f f f f f f f f
e + × F × F F + < D < × F F + F × + 1 1 1 1
, , , min j d . 
And third, it must hold true that  i i min,
* j j > . It can be verified that the third condition is implied 
by  the  first  and  the  second  condition.  Intuitively,  the  parameter  restrictions  imply  that  the 
overall business conditions in the modern sector of the two countries must not be too different. 
Trade balance and open economy equilibrium. To complete the characterization of the open 
economy equilibrium we have to impose balanced trade. This allows us to derive the masses of 
firms  and  the  CES  price  indices  ( ) ( )
1 * ) 1 /( ) 1 /( 1 /
- - - = i i i i i w f L P rj s b
s s s  (see  appendix  E).  The 
indirect utility then follows as: 9 











































w v      (8) 
4  Policy analysis 
4.1  Gains from trade and trade liberalization with identical countries 
Our model deviates from the seminal contribution by Melitz (2003) in several ways: First, he 
used a one-sector increasing returns economy (‘modern sector’) whereas we consider a two 
sector economy which adds a traditional sector. Second, we consider an extensive list of country 
asymmetries.  And  finally,  Melitz  leaves  the  productivity  lottery  unspecified,  whereas  our 
analysis, for simplicity and tractability, draws on a Pareto distribution.
8 
However, we can replicate Melitz’s central (qualitative) results even in our two-sector economy, 
once  we  assume  that  the  countries  under  consideration  are  identical.  Abstracting  from  all 
country  differences  (such  that  1
, , , min =
w fe j d D  and  F = F = F F H )  and  normalizing  the  labor 
productivity in the traditional sector to be  1 = = j i a a , we have  1 = = j i w w . The cutoffs under 





* 1 F j j + =  both for H  and for F . Since  0 > F , it 




aut i i j j >  
which entails that the switch from autarky to trade implies a welfare benefit – the gains from 
trade. Moreover, a liberalization of trade costs (i.e. increasing the trade freeness F), yields an 
increase in the cutoff,  0 /
* > F d d i j  which implies that (reciprocal) trade liberalization yields 
welfare benefits. 
Underlying  these  positive  welfare  effects  is  the  aggregate  productivity  effect  identified  by 
Melitz. Both the switch from autarky to trade and the liberalization of trade lead to market entry 
of firms which reduces the demand for each producer and thereby drives the least productive 
firms  out  of  business.  This  selection  process  raises  the  cutoff  productivity,  the  aggregate 
productivity and the consumer’s welfare.
9  
                                                 
8 The Melitz (2003) model, of course, is easily reformulated with the Pareto specification (Baldwin 2005). 
9 This process is similar to the ‘competition effect’ known in the New Economic Geography (e.g. Baldwin et al. 
2003) as the reduction of demand associated with the market entry of firms works through a fall in the price level 
(see eq. (2), the price level  P , which falls, when the mass of firms rises and remember that  L P z p z q b
s s 1 ) ( ) (
- - = ). 
In the original Melitz (2003) model where the wage is normalized to one and where no traditional sector exists, this 
fall in the price level amounts to an increase in the real wage  P / 1  which is why this process can also be thought of 
as working through the domestic factor market. Note, that this effect (however it may be termed) is distinct from 10 
4.2  The technology potential and its consequences 
International productivity differences are a classic topic in international economics ever since 
Ricardo’s (1821) reflections On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Altogether 
new and different insights arise when technological asymmetries across countries are allowed 
for in models with heterogeneous firms, however. The seminal contribution by Demidova (2008) 
highlights differences in the technology potential in the sense that the ‘productivity lottery’ in 
one country stochastically dominates another country’s lottery, or, to put it more prosaically, 
that firms, upon making an upfront entry investment, in some countries have access to a better 
pool of technologies than in other countries. Like Melitz (2003), Demidova (2008) departs from 
a general distribution of the ‘productivity lottery’. Of course, the essence of her analysis can 
also be conveyed by working with the Pareto specification of the productivity lottery. More 
specifically, we assume that one country, say H , disposes of a better technology potential in the 
heterogeneous  sector  in  the  sense  that  the  minimal  productivity  draw  exceeds  the  minimal 
productivity draw in country F , i.e.  F H min min j j > .
10 
Abstracting from all other country asymmetries and assuming  F H min min j j >  her main insights 
are easily portrayed in our model. From eq. (5) it is immediately clear that the productivity 
cutoff is higher in country  H  as compared to country  F , and, hence, so is country H ’s welfare 
level. For the open economy we now have  ( )
k
F H
k w f T
e
min min
, , , /
min j j
j d = = D  and  F = F = F F H  
so  that  the  cutoffs,  eq.  (7),  are  given  by  ( ) ( ) [ ]
k k
aut H H T
/ 1 2 *
,
* 1 1 F × - F - × =j j  and 
( ) ( ) [ ]
k k
aut F F T
/ 1 2 *
,
* / 1 1 F - F - × =j j , respectively. A comparison with eq. (5) reveals that despite 
differences in technology potentials both the ‘laggard country’ (F ) and the ‘leading’ country 
(H ) achieve gains from trade.
11 
An intriguing new insight emerges when a unilateral improvement in the technology potential in 
one  country  (say  H )  takes  place.  This  immediately  entails  0 /
* > dT d H j  and  0 /
* < dT d F j . 
Intuitively,  a  unilateral  improvement  in  the  technology  potential  of  country  i  raises  the 
profitability of the domestic market and gives local firms a competitive edge over their foreign 
competitors. This stimulates entry in country i and reduces the incentive to enter the modern 
industry in country  j . The induced selection effect then leads to higher cutoffs and welfare in i 
                                                                                                                                                            
the pro-competitive effect that arises in models where the mark-up over marginal costs is non-constant and is 
reduced when more firms enter the market (see Ottaviano et al. 2002 and Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). 
10 This special case has also been analyzed by Falvey et al. (2011) and by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). 
11 Note that the parameter restrictions from section 3 still hold. Hence, the multiplicative terms of the international 
cutoffs are greater than one and the national cutoff productivities under trade greater than under autarky. 11 
and lower cutoffs and welfare in  j . Productivity improvements are thus a boon for the country 
where these improvements take place but they are a bane for the other country.
12 
What is the welfare effect of symmetric trade integration if the two countries differ with respect 
to  their  technology  potential  but  are  identical  in  all  other  respects?  Exploring  the  effect  of 
F = F = F d d d F H  on the two countries’ cutoffs and indirect utilities leads to the conclusion that 
immiserization in the technologically inferior country would occur iff  ( ) ( )
2 , , , 1 / 2
min F + F < D
w fe j d  
or  ( ) ( ) F F + > D 2 / 1
2 , , , min w fe j d . However, these cases are ruled out in our model specification by 
the  parameter  restrictions  we  made  to  obtain  a  consistent  analysis.  More  precisely,  the 
parameter  conditions  for  immiserization  are  also  the  conditions  under  which  the  ‘laggard 
country’ becomes fully specialized in the traditional good sector. Hence, we can conclude for 
our model specification that symmetric trade liberalization by necessity improves welfare in 
both countries.
13 Yet, drawing on Pflüger and Russek (2011a) we shall show and explain below 
that immiserization becomes a distinct possibly if the two countries differ in further business 
conditions, notably if they differ in size and market accessibility (see section 4.5).  
4.3  Entry subsidies and welfare 
An entrepreneur who is about to start business is faced with sunk costs related with the research 
and development of new products and with legal barriers to entry such as licenses and permits. 
However, governments also provide numerous programs of support for the foundation of new 
firms. Such subsidies to market entry and R&D are very widely used. Unlike classical trade 
policy instruments such as import tariffs or export subsidies these policies are perceived as 
largely domestic issues and therefore not scrutinized by bodies like the WTO.  
Taking  these  observations  as  starting  point,  Pflüger  and  Südekum  (2009)  explore  the 
implications of entry subsidies in the two-sector model that we laid out in sections 2 and 3. 
Governments  unconditionally  provide  entry  subsidies  s  which  reduce  the  entry  costs  for 
(potential) firms from their raw level  e f  to the effective level  s f f e e - º
~
. These subsidies are 
financed by a lump-sum tax t levied at the household level. The government budget constraint 
is then given by 
E M s L t × = × . Governments are assumed to be benevolent. They choose their 
                                                 
12 This qualitative finding was also found by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). 
13 Demidova (2008, proposition 1) provides an intuitive argument that in her analysis which uses a Cobb-Douglas 
upper tier utility and a general distribution of firm productivities such immiserization might possibly occur in the 
laggard country in the absence of specialization. In contrast to Demidova (2008), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) 
show for their alternative framework that symmetric trade integration leads to mutual increases in productivity and 
welfare which is in line with our finding. 12 
policy such that the indirect utility of households v is maximized subject to the government 
budget constraint. In the following we will look at the base case where countries are assumed to 
be identical with the exception of possible differences in entry subsidies.
14 
Starting with the autarky case, the optimal entry subsidy is immediately derived as  s /
*
e aut f s = . 
This  subsidy  is  positively  related  to  the  raw  level  of  entry  costs  e f  and  negatively  to  the 
elasticity of substitution s . To gain an intuitive understanding of this result it is worthwhile to 
reflect on the market distortions that prevail in our two-sector economy.
15 There is in fact one 
distortion,  the  monopoly  power  of  firms  in  the  modern  sector  relative  to  the  perfectly 
competitive traditional sector. Output is too low in the modern sector since prices are too high 
as indicated by the parameter s  which determines the mark-up on marginal costs (see eq. (3)). 
This monopoly distortion provides the intuition for the negative relationship between 
*
aut s  and 
s . The larger this distortion, the stronger is the incentive to subsidize. This is because an entry 
subsidy leads to firm entry, tougher competition and a higher cutoff, i.e. a selection effect which 
implies that the firms that remain in the market are more productive. However, the optimal 
entry subsidy that we reported above is just a second-best optimal policy. A direct way to target 
this  distortion  would  be  to  subsidize  consumption  (or,  alternatively,  production)  of  the 
differentiated  varieties.  Pflüger  and  Südekum  (2009)  show  that  if  the  government  had  two 
instruments at its disposal, a consumption subsidy and an entry subsidy, the optimal policy 
would be to subsidize consumption at the rate  s / 1 . The positive relationship between 
*
aut s  and 
e f  follows the same logic as above: a reduction in the raw entry costs tightens the welfare-
enhancing selection, so that the second-best optimal entry subsidy is smaller.  
Policies that target the entry of firms are highly pervasive, in practice. Hence, even though they 
are second-best, it is very important to understand their implications. This holds a fortiori for 
the  open  economy.  Suppose  we  have  two  identical  countries  (such  that  1
, , , min =
w fe j d D  and 
F = F = F F H ) which competitively choose their optimal entry subsidies. Each country takes 
the entry subsidy of the other country as given and a Nash equilibrium can then be determined. 
Before proceeding to this Nash equilibrium note that an exogenous decrease of the entry costs 
in one country (say H ) raises the cutoff productivity in H  and lowers the cutoff productivity in 
F  (see  eq.  (7)).  Intuitively,  the  increased  competition  and  selection  induced  by  the  entry 
                                                 
14 Pflüger and Südekum (2009) show that the basic insights carry over to a setting with further country asymmetries, 
notably country size. 
15 Note that a one-sector version of the model of monopolistic competition does not exhibit this distortion; see e.g. 
Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009). 13 
subsidies is transmitted to the other country. Export market entry becomes more difficult for 
foreign enterprises, as domestic firms are now more productive and competitive. Hence, the 
foreign  country  experiences  a  negative  selection  effect,  a  welfare-reducing  fall  in  its 
productivity cutoff.  
The  Nash  equilibrium  subsidy  can  straightforwardly  be  calculated  as 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 2 1 1 1 * - F + - F + F - = s s s e f s .  A  detailed  inspection  of  * s  reveals  that,  for  the 
case  2 > s , on which we focus, there is a bell-shaped relation between this subsidy and the 
parameter  of  trade  freeness  F .  If  trade  costs  are  prohibitive,  0 = F ,  the  Nash  subsidy  is 
s / * e f s = .  It  then  rises  in  F ,  reaches  a  peak  and  falls  thereafter  continuously.  At 
( ) s s / 2 - = F  it reaches  s / * e f s =  again and it approaches  0 *= s  when trade is completely 
costless,  1 = F . Pflüger and Südekum (2009) also derive the optimal cooperative entry subsidy 
which  maximizes  welfare  (indirect  utility)  in  both  regions  jointly.  Intuitively,  this  optimal 
cooperative subsidy coincides with the optimal entry subsidy under autarky,  s / e f . Comparing 
the non-cooperative (Nash) solution with the cooperative subsidy then reveals that these policies 
coincide  at  0 = F  and  at  ( ) s s / 2 - = F  but  that  there  is  over-subsidization  for  the  range 
( ) s s / 2 0 - < F <  and under-subsidization for the range ( ) 1 / 2 < F < - s s . 
What  is  the  reason  for  this  non-monotonic  effect  of  trade  liberalization  on  the  Nash-
equilibrium-subsidies? This question can be approached from two perspectives. First, we can 
look at the marginal benefits and marginal costs associated with these policies. The marginal 
benefit is the tighter selection process in the domestic market which gives domestic firms a 
competitive advantage in international trade. The marginal costs are that higher entry subsidies 
have to be financed by higher lump-sum taxes. Both marginal benefits and marginal costs can 
be shown to rise with the level of trade freeness. However, starting at autarky, marginal benefits 
rise more strongly at low levels of trade freeness than marginal costs whereas the opposite holds 
true for high levels of trade freeness. Intuitively, high entry subsidies are particularly attractive 
at high trade costs, since the firms that emerge as domestic exporters are highly productive and 
snatch substantial market shares from their rivals. However, when trade costs are low, there are 
already many domestic exporters and their productivity advantage compared to local (foreign) 
firms is smaller. Financing the entry subsidy is then also more costly as many entrepreneurs are 
induced to start up business without yielding a strong competitive edge vis-à-vis the foreign 
rivals. A second perspective looks at the international externalities that are associated with entry 
subsidization in open economies. There is the negative (inverse) selection effect that drives 
down the cutoff in the other economy. However, there is also a positive spillover in that the 14 
foreign budget is relaxed as the number of foreign firms trying to enter falls. Netting out these 
externalities gives the result that the net externality is negative for low levels of trade freeness 
and  high  for  high  levels  of  trade  freeness,  rationalizing  the  results  of  over-  und 
undersubsidization,  respectively.  These  results  imply  that  there  are  gains  from  policy 
cooperation  such  that  the  net-externality  is  internalized.  Importantly,  whether  such  a 
cooperation involves a decrease or increase of the subsidy rates depends crucially on the level 
of trade freeness. In particular, a complete joint removal of all entry subsidies would lead to a 
welfare loss. 
4.4  Improving the research infrastructure 
Another widely observed policy in developed economies is the financing of R&D both in direct 
form of public research projects and higher education and in indirect form by e.g. subsidising 
private  research  and  development  or  installing  innovation  funds.  Bohnstedt,  Schwarz  and 
Südekum (2011) document per capita R&D spending in constant US-$ for 21 OECD countries 
in the years 2000 and 2007/08. The United States (381,3 $) and the Nordic countries (Norway 
355,5 $, Sweden 352,8 $ and Finland 334,1 $) are the leaders in 2007/2008 and they have 
experienced  substantial  increases  from  2000  on.  Only  for  two  countries,  Japan  and  the 
Netherlands, have these expenditures fallen. The weighted average has risen from 232,5 $ to 
286,9 $. 
As with entry subsidies, little was known about the effects of international trade on the choice 
of public research and development expenses. Bohnstedt, Schwarz and Südekum (2011) shed 
light on the issue by making use of the simple two sector model of section 3. They assume that 
governments levy a lump-sum tax to finance basic research which is assumed to have the effect 
of raising the technological potential of a country as expressed by the minimum productivity 
draw  i min j  of  the  Pareto  distribution  as  in  section  4.2.  After  assuming  a  simple  concave 
specification between a country’s tax income and its level of basic research on the one hand, 
and  choosing  a  simple  specification  between  the  level  of  basic  research  and  the  minimum 
productivity draw  i min j  the analysis proceeds similarly as in Pflüger and Südekum (2009).  
Bohnstedt, Schwarz and Südekum (2011) identify two motives for public research policies. The 
‘benevolent’ motive is to tighten firm selection which raises average productivity, reduces the 
average consumer price in an economy and increases welfare. This effect is similar to the effect 
of entry subsidies and becomes already clear in the autarky scenario as the domestic cutoff rises 
with the technological potential (see eq. (5)). In open economies there also is a strategic motive. 15 
If one country invests more than the other, its firms obtain a competitive advantage over their 
foreign  competitors  for  similar  reasons  as  in  the  previous  section.  Firms  from  the  ‘laggard 
country’  now  face  tougher  import  competition  and  have  greater  difficulties  to  export  their 
products.  In  terms  of  our  model  above,  we  would  find  that  F H T min min /j j º  changes  by 
asymmetric investments into basic research, which alters the cutoffs of the two countries (see eq. 
(7)).  If  countries  decide  non-cooperatively  on  the  volume  of  research  investments,  they 
overinvest as they do not take into account the negative cross-country externality which they 
exert on each other. Thus there are welfare gains by supranational policy cooperation.  
Bohnstedt,  Schwarz  and  Südekum  (2011)  then  go  on  by  allowing  the  possibility  of  cross-
country  R&D  spillovers,  i.e.  a  positive  technological  externality.  Investments  into  basic 
research in one country then do not only increase the domestic but also the foreign technology 
potential. In terms of our model, we can express spillovers by  ( ) j i f min min j j =  where  ( ) · f  is an 
increasing function in its argument. This positive cross-country externality (partially) offsets the 
negative competition externality such that the overinvestment problem is mitigated. If these 
R&D spillovers are sufficiently strong, the overinvestment problem might even turn into an 
underinvestment problem. In the light of recent research which shows that spillovers are highly 
localized (see e.g. Keller 2004), we would deem the latter outcome as rather unlikely, however. 
4.5  Business Conditions 
Business conditions, in practice, depend on many more factors than those we have considered in 
previous sections. This observation is the starting point of the analysis by Pflüger and Russek 
(2011a).  They  consider  a  comprehensive  set  of  factors  that  determine  the  conditions  to  do 
business as laid out in section 3 and they focus on the impact of trade and industrial policies on 
national productivities and welfare. 
With respect to the shift from autarky to international trade, it becomes immediately apparent 
from an inspection of the cutoffs in eq. (7) that both countries reap welfare gains from trade 
even if they are asymmetric with respect to a variety of national business conditions. Moreover, 
even in the case where business conditions are so disparate that the 'laggard' country is driven 
into full specialization in the traditional industry by the shift from autarky to trade, and where 
consequentially all manufactures are produced in the 'leading' country, there are mutual gains 
from trade.
16 
                                                 
16 The specialization model is laid out in Pflüger and Russek (2011a). 16 
Concerning the impact of bilateral trade integration, Pflüger and Russek (2011a) show that a 
symmetric  reduction  in  trade  costs  (i.e.,  0 > F = F F H d d )  leads  to  welfare  gains  in  both 
countries iff aggregate international business conditions (as measured by 
w fe , , , min j d D ) are similar 
as indicated by the range ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) F H F
w f
H F H
e F + F F + < D < F + F + F / 1 1 /
2 , , , 2 min j d . Otherwise, the 
country which is the ‘laggard’ in terms of aggregated business conditions experiences welfare 
losses whereas the ‘leader’ reaps welfare gains. Hence, while we have shown that differences in 
technology  potentials  do  not  suffice  to  obtain  immiserization  of  the  ‘laggard’,  such 
immiserization  becomes  a  distinct  possibility  once  we  account  for  asymmetric  business 
conditions  in  a  much  more  comprehensive  sense.  This  becomes  evident  by  noting  that 
( ) 1 , , , min - º D
s s j d k k
e
w f W T DF
e  can  deviate  from  unity  even  if  1 / min min = º F H T j j ,  indicating 
identical technology potentials.
17 Furthermore, note that with differences in country size and 
market accessibility the parameter range of non-immiserization no longer coincides with the 
condition  of  non-specialization.  Hence,  in  contrast  to  section  4.2.,  immiserization  of  the 
‘laggard’ is a possible outcome (appendix F provides a numerical example). 
The effect of bilateral trade integration can be decomposed into two unilateral trade integration 
measures. Unilateral trade integration is understood as an opening of a country’s border for 
products from its trading partner without an equivalent measure on behalf of its trading partner 
(e.g.,  0 > FH d  whereas  0 = FF d ). A unilateral border opening facilitates export activities of 
foreign  firms  which  tightens  competition  abroad  and  increases  the  cutoff  and  the  level  of 
welfare  of  the  trading  partner.  The  liberalizing  country,  instead,  faces  tougher  import 
competition so that the domestic cutoff and the domestic level welfare of decrease.
18 
Concerning the effects of industrial policies, Pflüger and Russek (2011a) provide a considerable 
generalization  of  the  finding  that  productivity  improvements  in  one  country  hurt  the  other 
country as shown by Demidova (2008). In fact, it follows immediately from the cutoffs (7) and 
the indirect utility (8) that the very same result holds with respect to comparative advantages 
due to lower wages, a lower exit risk and easier market entry.
19 Importantly, asymmetric effects 
on productivities and on welfare obtain in the two countries even if technology potentials are 
identical between countries. Furthermore, policy measures are sensitive with respect to the level 
                                                 
17 Note that differences in country size are inconsequential as was already found in Baldwin and Forslid (2006) and 
Baldwin (2005). However, these authors concluded that symmetric trade integration must raise welfare in both 
countries. The difference to our findings can be explained by noting that the authors did neither account for 
differences in technology potentials nor the comprehensive set of business conditions that we highlight. 
18 This qualitative finding was anticipated by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).  
19 Differences in  i f  have an additional effect on productivities as they alternate the relative access of foreign firms 
to the domestic market (as  ( )( ) ( ) 1 / 1 /





ij i f f ). See Pflüger and Russek (2011a) for more details. 17 
of trade integration. The smaller are trade costs, the greater is the impact on productivities and, 
hence, welfare. This result mimics what has previously been obtained in models of the new 
trade  theory  and  the  new  economic  geography  with  homogeneous  firms  (cf.  Helpman  and 
Krugman 1985; Baldwin et al. 2003) and the underlying mechanism is the same in both settings 
(see also Ossa 2011). 
4.6  A re-examination of the exit process 
Following Melitz (2003) we assumed in section 2 that the exit risk of mature firms (i.e. firms 
that successfully entered the market after drawing their productivity) is given by the constant 
exogenous probability of firm death d  and therefore independent of the productivity of the firm. 
The merits of this simplification are twofold. First, it facilitates the establishment of a steady 
state equilibrium where the productivity range, and hence the average productivity, of surviving 
firms is endogenously determined (Melitz 2003:1701). Second, if the group of firms whose 
entry is not successful is taken into account, the model is in accord with the robust empirical 
finding, that new entrants have, on average, lower productivity and higher exit probability than 
incumbents (Melitz 2003:1701), or, seen from a different angle, exiting firms have a lower 
productivity, on average, than surviving firms (Redding 2011: 6).  
The model of section 2 has the further implication that the overall exit rate in the economy is 
positively  related  to  the  equilibrium  cutoff  productivity.  Put  differently,  the  higher  is  the 
equilibrium cutoff productivity of an economy and, hence, the average productivity of its firms 
in the market, the higher the exit rate. This becomes clear as the number of exiting mature firms 
in  each  period  is  given  by  M × d  and  the  number  of  unsuccessful  entrants  is  ( )
E M G × * j . 
Adding these up and recognizing that in the steady state  ( ) [ ]
E M G M × - = × * 1 j d , it follows that 
the overall number of exiting firms is 
E M . No matter whether we define the overall exit rate as 
M M
E /  or as  ( )
E E M M M + /  our claim is easily verified.
20 Since the death rate of mature firms 
is constant, this implication for an economy’s overall exit rate is purely driven by the negative 
correlation between the cutoff productivity and the exit of failing business start-ups, i.e. firms 
dying young. Even though it has hard to come by with solid comparable international data, this 
positive correlation appears to be in line with the available data.
21  
                                                 
20 Under the assumption of a Pareto distribution  ( )
k E M M
min * / / j j d × =  which rises in 
* j . The same holds true 
for  ( )
E E M M M + / . 
21 The non-availability of comparable cross-country data on firm exits is a crucial problem. Although great efforts 
have been made to develop comparable statistics on firm dynamics in many countries in recent years (see Dunne et 
al. 2009 or Bartelsmann et al., 2009), these efforts have largely been independent, however. Hence, the data reflect 18 
However,  all  its  merits  notwithstanding,  the  assumption  of  a  constant  exogenous  death 
probability for mature firms is very strong (Redding 2010:6). In particular, the assumption sits 
very uncomfortably with the facts. Concerning mature firms, the empirical evidence strongly 
suggests that less productive firms are much more likely to exit markets than more productive 
ones.  This  finding  has  consistently  been  obtained  for  a  large  number  of  countries  in  many 
studies.  Apparently,  more  productive  firms  dispose  of  greater  ability  to  adapt  to  their 
environment and to make higher profits and, hence, have a greater buffer against adverse shocks. 
Moreover, using the perceived risk of insolvency in countries as proxy for the average death 
rate of mature firms a cross-country comparison suggests a negative correlation between the 
average  death  rate  of  mature  firms  and  the  average  productivity  of  firms  (see  Pflüger  and 
Russek 2011b). This negative relationship is clearly at odds with Melitz (2003). 
Moreover,  a  nascent  literature  suggests  that  policies  and  institutions  affecting  the  business 
climate in a broadly defined way are central for the understanding of firm dynamics, and so in 
particular for business exits (Bartelsmann et al. 2009). This literature makes clear that business 
conditions,  i.e.  the  legal  and  institutional  framework  for  doing  business,  a  country’s 
infrastructure  and  microeconomic  policies,  macroeconomic  factors,  and  also  a  country’s 
embedment  into  world  trade  are  important  determinants  of  producer  dynamics  and  should 
explicitly be taken into account. 
Pflüger and Russek (2011b) provide a model which takes these aspects into account. The key 
element of their analysis is to assume that the default risk on the level of the firms is inversely 
related to the firm’s productivity such that  ( ) j d d =  and  ( ) 0 ' < j d . Their analysis holds for 
general specifications of the productivity lottery  ( ) j g  and of the relationship  ( ) j d . For ease of 
exposition, we assume a Pareto distribution of firm productivities and we work with the simple 
specification,  ( ) j j d / 1 = ,  in  the  following.  Three  types  of  average  exit  rates  can  then  be 
derived for a steady state (see Pflüger and Russek 2011b for details). The average death rate of 
mature firms is given by  ( ) [ ]
1 * 1
- × - j k k , the average death rate of start-ups (entrants) follows 




- - - × - j j j
k k k k  and  the  overall  average  death  rate  is  ( ) [ ] [ ]
k k k k min
1 * 1 j j
- × - . 
The cutoff productivity 
* j  is key for all three concepts of average death rates: both the average 
death rate of entrants and the overall average death rate are positively linked to the cutoff-
productivity 
* j  whereas the average death rate of mature firms is negatively correlated with 
* j . 
                                                                                                                                                            
strong country idiosyncrasies. For example, in contrast to Germany, countries like Spain, Italy and Greece do not 
embrace small enterprises in their statistics. Moreover, in these Mediterranean countries firms often choose less 
formal and juridical ways to deal with bankruptcy which are also not included in the data (e.g., a settlement or a 
moratorium, see CreditReform 2007, 2009). Hence their insolvency rates are strongly biased downwards.  19 
Solving the model with  ( ) j d d =  allows Pflüger and Russek (2011b) to derive sharp predictions 
concerning how key factors shape a country’s business and trade environment and, therefore, 
impact on the average exit risk of firms. We look at the implications for the average death rates 
of mature firms in the following.
22 First, the expected risk of business exit falls when a country 
moves  from  autarky  to  trade.  Intuitively,  trade  opening  induces  a  competition  effect  which 
drives up the productivity threshold to survive and hence the average productivity of firms. The 
country-specific exit risk falls as firms become more productive on average. Second, the effect 
of trade integration on the country-specific exit risk depends on the liberalization path and on 
the country’s business conditions relative to those of its trading partners. More specifically, a 
country  that  opens  up  unilaterally  and  grants  foreign  firms  better  access  to  its  consumers 
experiences an increase in its rate of firm death whilst the average firm death risk in the trading 
partner  country  falls.  A  symmetric  trade  integration  path  reduces  the  exit  risk  in  the  two 
countries if and only if the business conditions in these countries are similar. As soon as one 
country has significantly better business conditions on average (we make this concept precise in 
our theoretical analysis), this country experiences a fall in its default risk while the risk of 
business exit rises in the other country. Third, turning to the effects of business conditions for a 
given state of trade integration, we show that a country’s exit risk is independent of the size of 
its population and the size of its trading partner. The country specific exit risk rises when entry 
investments  in  this  (the  other)  country  rise  (fall),  when  its  (the  other  country’s)  technical 
potential falls (rises) and when wage costs in this (the other) country rise (fall). The effect of an 
increase in the fixed investments necessary to supply the domestic market (i.e. for a distribution 
or  retailing  network,  the  costs  of  contract  enforcement  or  corruption  expenditures)  on  a 
country’s default risk is to decrease the risk of firm death if trade is sufficiently costly, whilst 
the exit risk in the other country unambiguously falls. A cursory look at the data involving the 
perceived insolvency risk as in figure 1 reveals that for this group of European countries these 
predictions  are  consistent  with  the  observations  (Pflüger  and  Russek  2011b).  Clearly,  solid 
econometric work is needed to go beyond the simple correlations reported in that paper. The 
causality issue needs to be addressed, in particular. Moreover, further and better data involving 
a much broader sample of countries are desirable, too. The simple model specification discussed 
in  this  section  appears  to  be  an  adequate  starting  point  for  deeper  empirical  investigations, 
however. 
                                                 
22 This analysis focuses on the long-run steady state equilibrium and thereby abstracts both from the business cycle 
as well as from short-run adjustment processes.  20 
5  Conclusion 
Using a simple two-sector model of monopolistic competition in the spirit of the new trade 
theory as a unifying framework, this paper has synthesized recent research which started to 
explore economic policy implications of the theories of heterogeneous firms and trade. Key 
lessons of this research are the following. First, there are gains from trade even if the countries 
under  consideration  differ  in  the  conditions  of  doing  business.  Second,  differences  in 
technology potentials have strong asymmetric effects for trading partners in the sense that the 
leading countries win and lagging countries lose in welfare terms. Third, seemingly domestic 
policies such as subsidies to entry or subsidies to R&D have strong international repercussions. 
Non-cooperatively chosen policies typically deviate from optimal cooperative policies in non-
trivial  ways,  so  that  there  is  scope  for  welfare-improving  policy  coordination.  Fourth, 
symmetric trade liberalization may lead to immiserization in the country with inferior business 
conditions. Fifth, a re-examination of the exit process of firms which takes into account that 
more productive mature firms are less likely to die, delivers new insights for the average rate of 
firm death at the country level. The analytical ease with which the model can be employed to 
address country asymmetries should make it an attractive tool to study other policy issues such 
as policy competition in further instruments, multi-country extensions to address preferential 
trade agreements and political economy applications in future work. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A – The FEC and ZCPC condition 
Using  wf r - = s j j p / ) ( ) (  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) j j j j
s ~ ~ /
1r r
- =  where  [ ]
) 1 /( 1 * 1 ~ - - > º
s s j j j E j  is  a 
measure  of  average  productivity,  and  imposing  0 =
E v ,  the  FEC  can  be  derived  as 
( ) [ ] ) ( 1 / ~ * j d j p G f w e - = .  Using  ( ) ( ) [ ] f w r - = s j j p / ~ ~  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) j j j j
s ~ ~ /
1 * * r r
-
= ,  the  ZCPC 
condition  can  be  expressed  as  a  function  of  the  average  productivity  level  j ~ : 
( ) ( ) [ ] f w 1 / ~ ~ 1 * - =
- s
j j j p . 
Appendix B – Firm masses, the price level and indirect utility under autarky 
In equilibrium, the aggregate expenditure on manufacturing has to be equal to the aggregate 
revenue  of  manufacturing  firms,  ( ) j b ~ r M L = .  Using  ( ) ( ) f w r s j j j
s 1 * / ~ ~ -
= , 
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) * 1 / 1 1 / ~ j s j
s- - - = k k , and the equilibrium cutoff (5), the number of active firms can be 
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b s 1 -
= . Using  aut M  and  ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) * 1 / 1 1 / ~ j s j
s- - - = k k  in (4),  yields the price level, 
( )
( ) ( )( )
* 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / aut aut w f L P rj s b
s s s - - =  and the indirect utility of a household is then as in eq. (6). 
Appendix C – The link between the productivity cutoffs in the open economy 
From  the  ZCP  conditions  it  follows  that  ( ) i i i i i i i f w L P r s b rj j
s
= =
-1 * *) (  and 
( ) xi i j j xi i ij xi xi f w L P w r s b rj t j
s s
= =
- - 1 1 * * / ) ( . Consequently, we have 
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Combining  (C1)  and  (C3)  leads  to 
* ) 1 /( *
F H xH t W j j
s s - - =  and 
* ) 1 /( *
H F xF t W j j
s s - =  where 
( )
) 1 /( 1 /
- º
s t i xi ij i f f t . 
Appendix D: Determination of equilibrium cutoffs in the open economy 
The free entry condition (FEC) for country i is given by  
  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] i ei i xi xi xi i i i i i f w G G d j j j p E j j j j p E j × × = > × - + > × -
* * * * ) ( 1 ) ( 1     (D1) 
As  ( ) ( ) i i i i f w r - = s j j p / , we can write the expected domestic profits as 
    ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] i i i i i i f w r - > = >
* * 1
j j j E
s
j j j p E  
Using  ( ) i i i i L P w r b rj j
s s 1 1 / ) (
- - =  and the Pareto specification we get 
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On substituting  ( ) i i i i f w r s j =
*  which is implied by the domestic ZCPC  ( ) 0
* = i i j p , we have:  








j j j p E         (D2) 
The expected export profits are determined in the same manner. Now we use export profits, 
export revenue, the previous parameterizations as well as the export ZCPC to obtain:  
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Substituting  (D2)  and  (D3)  into  (D1)  and  using  ( )
k
i i i G j j j / 1 ) ( min - =  yields 






























.  Writing  this  equation  out  for 
F H i , =  and  using  the  relationships  between  export  cutoffs  and  domestic  cutoffs, 
* ) 1 /( *
F H xH t W j j
s s - - =  and 
* ) 1 /( *
H F xF t W j j
s s - =  as  derived  in  appendix  C  yields  two  equations 
which can be solved for the cutoffs 
*
H j  and 
*
F j  as stated in eq. (7). 
Appendix E: Firm masses, the price level and indirect utility under trade 
To derive the firm masses in the open economy equilibrium we have to impose balanced trade. 
From the perspective of the domestic economy, this condition is given by: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) H H H H H xF xF F xF xH xH H xH a L L w r M cprob r M cprob / 1 ~ ~ g b j j - - - + =  25 
where  ( )
k
xi i i xi xi prob prob cprob
* */ / j j = º  is the conditional probability to become an exporter 
in country i and where  H g  denotes the share of labor employed in the modern sector in country 
H . The LHS of eq. (8) gives the value of country H 's manufacturing exports and the first term 
on the RHS gives the value of manufacturing imports. The second and third term on the RHS 
are the values of domestic consumption and production of the traditional good, respectively. 
Any imbalance in trade in manufacturing must be matched by a trade surplus or deficit in this 
numéraire.  Now  use  this  balanced  trade  condition  and  substitute  i i i i i r w L M / g =  where 
( ) ( ) xi xi xi i i i r cprob r r j j ~ ~ + º ,  H H a w / 1 =  and  F F F H H H F H w L w L L L g g b + = + ) ( .  Solving  for  the 






























































































º -  is  an  increasing  measure  of  relative 
conditions favoring business in H  (against F ). Using  i g , the masses of firms are immediately 
implied  by  i i i i i w L r M g =  where  ( ) i i r j ~  follows  from  the  domestic  ZCPC  and  is  given  by 
( ) ( ) [ ] 1 / ~ - - = s s j k w f k r i i i i . Hence, we have 
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The number of exporting firms is implied by  i xi xi M cprob M =  and the mass of entrants follows 






i M M d j j
*
min
- = .  The  consumption  variety  available  in  country  i  is 
xj i ti M M M + = .  
With  the  price  setting  rule  defined  by  eq.  (3),  the  price  level  can  be  rewritten  as 
( ) ti i ti i p M P j s ~ 1
1
× = - .  The  variable  ( ) ( ) [ ] { } 1
1
1 1 1 1 ~ / ~ / 1 ~ - - - - - + = s s s s s j t j j xj ji i j xj i i ti ti w w M M M  is  an 
average productivity of all firms (domestic and foreign) that serve consumers in country i . 
Consumers  in  country  i  spend  ( ) i ti i ti L r M b j = ~  on  manufacturing  varieties  and  the  average 
firm revenue is related to the revenue of the cutoff firm according to  ( ) ( ) ( )
* 1 * / ~ ~
i i i ti ti i r r j j j j
s- = . 
With  ( ) i i i i f w r s j =
*  it follows that  ( ) i i i ti i ti f w L M s j j b
s
/ / ~ 1 * -
= . On substitution, this yields for 26 
the price level ( ) ( )
1 * ) 1 /( ) 1 /( 1 /
- - - = i i i i i w f L P rj s b
s s s . Notice that the derivation of the price level is 
independent from the derivation of the productivity thresholds and observe that it is completely 
general (it does not depend on the Pareto parameterization).  
Appendix F: Parameter restrictions  
Non-specialization: Using eqs. (E1) and imposing  0 ³ i M , both countries have manufacturing 
producers if  H
L
F F D F
j / 1
* , < < . By substituting  ( ) ( ) H
w f
F
w f L e e F D F D l D
j d j d j × - - × º
, , , , , , , min min
*
1 , 
where  F H L L / º l  is the ratio of labor endowment in H relative to F , and solving for 
w fe , , , min j d D , 
this condition for non-specialization in both countries can be rewritten as 





















Meaningful export-cutoffs: We assume that only firms that serve the domestic market can 
export,  i.e. 
* *
i xi j j > .  From  eq.  (C3)  it  follows  that  this  holds  true  whenever 
( ) ( )( ) 1 / / /
) 1 /( 1 ) 1 /( 1 >
- - s s t j i j i i xi ij L L P P f f .  Substituting  ( ) ( )
1 * ) 1 /( ) 1 /( 1 /
- - - = i i i i i w f L P rj s b
s s s  and 
rearranging yields  ( ) ( )
1 * * 1 / / /
- - >
s s s j j t j i i j ij j xi w w f f . Using the equilibrium cutoffs reported in 
eq. (7) and solving the inequality for 
w fe , , , min j d D , we have meaningful export cutoffs, whenever  
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Note that in Demidova (2008) the condition 
* *
i xi j j >  implies 
* *
j xi j j >  (i.e. that a domestic firm 
finds it easier to break even in its domestic market than a foreign exporter does) since her model 
assumes  1 = W .  However,  in  the  presence  of  a  possibly  large  wage  differential  it  is  quite 
conceivable that an exporting firm might find it easier to break even than a local firm does. 
Hence, the implication will not carry over to our model, in general. 
Linking the restrictions: To ensure that there is a range of parameters which simultaneously 
fulfils both inequalities we have to make sure that the lower bound of each parameter restriction 
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Numerical  examples: For the reader’s convenience we provide two numerical examples to 
illustrate that there is a broad parameter space despite the parameter restrictions made above. 
Assume  9 . 0 = l ,  8 . 0 = xH H f f ,  7 . 0 = xF F f f .  A)  If  5 . 0 = FH  and  35 . 0 = FF ,  the  non-
specialization  condition  reads  21 . 1 62 . 0
, , , min < D <
w fe j d ,  the  condition  for  meaningful  export 
cutoff is  26 . 1 53 . 0
, , , min < D <
w fe j d  and the linking condition  16 . 8 14 . 0 < < l  which is fulfilled by 
9 . 0 = l .  The  interval  for  mutual  gains  from  symmetric  trade  liberalization  is  given  by 
21 . 1 68 . 0
, , , min < D <
w fe j d . For  68 . 0 62 . 0
, , , min < D <
w fe j d  country H  loses, whereas country F  wins. 
B) If  4 . 0 = FH  and  65 . 0 = FF , the non-specialization condition is  62 . 1 07 . 1
, , , min < D <
w fe j d , the 
condition for meaningful export cutoff is  67 . 1 94 . 0
, , , min < D <
w fe j d  and the linking condition is 
49 . 5 21 . 0 < < l . If  35 . 1 07 . 1
, , , min < D <
w fe j d  both countries win by symmetric trade integration. 
For  62 . 1 35 . 1
, , , min < D <
w fe j d  country F  loses, whereas country H  gains. 
 